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Won’t You Please Unite? Cultural Evolution and Kinds of Synthesis
Maria E. Kronfeldner
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,” Dobzhansky (1973) famously 
said. Today the phrase seems to have mutated to an all-encompassing slogan, spanning all areas of 
science and society: nothing at all seems to make sense except in the light of evolution. Almost 
everything that is able to change and does not change in a sudden and abrupt way is said to evolve. 
Political agendas, partnerships, economies, firms, behavioral patterns, and theories – they evolve. 
Stars, galaxies and the universe – they evolve too. Richard Dawkins (1983) has tried to convince 
scientists and the public that we need a ‘universal Darwinism’, while Donald Campbell (1997) and 
David Hull et al. (2001) defend a ‘general selection theory’. Finally, since the so-called ‘Modern 
Synthesis’ has gone stale, a new grand synthesis has been announced, or called for, in expanding 
or (re-)widening the ‘evolutionary synthesis’ of the 1930s to 50s in various directions: towards 
neutral evolution, post-genomics, epigenetics, eco-evo-devo, and, last, but not least, towards 
culture.1 ‘Won’t you please unite,’ in the name of evolution, is the slogan that seems to be 
everywhere.
For this paper, the most important aspect of these calls for an extension of the Modern 
Synthesis is that they seem to rely on an implicit epistemic bias: a bias that favors unity rather than 
difference. It is this bias and the value of specific kinds of syntheses that will be central here. What 
kind of synthesis the Modern Synthesis actually was, and what or whom it left out, are issues that 
have since long been a matter of debate.2 I won’t say anything on these issues. I will rather address 
the kinds of synthesis that are involved when we extend the evolutionary synthesis towards culture. 
By using the history of theories of cultural evolution, I will then develop an outline for an argument 
against the bias towards synthesis. 
After illustrating in section 1 in more detail how culture enters the evolutionary frame and 
what I mean by an epistemic bias towards synthesis, I shall present in section 2 a short history of 
theories of cultural evolution, followed by a review of two contemporary models: memetics and 
contemporary dual inheritance theories. In section 3, I will proceed to an analysis of four kinds of 
synthesis that usually enter the debate about the relationship between culture and evolution. I will 
distinguish between (i) the integration of fields, (ii) the heuristic generation of interfields, (iii) 
expansion of validity, and (iv) the creation of a common frame of discourse or a ‘big-picture’. These 
will encompass the four most important kinds of synthesis involved in theories of cultural 
evolution. Central for the issue about the epistemic value of synthesis is the relation between (i) 
and (ii). I shall thus develop in section 4 some critical notes on the value of synthesis from a 
historical point of view. 
The overall aim of the paper is also to introduce a new stance in discussions about cultural 
evolution. So far, theories of cultural evolution have been addresses from mainly two stances. 
There are those who take a skeptical stance (e.g. Fracchia and Lewontin 1999): this skeptical or 
critical stance focuses on conceptual analysis and on finding or denying at a theoretical level the 
perils of theories of cultural evolution. Yet, there are also those who are fed up with such debates 
1 See the short report in Whitfield (2008) or Blute (2008). For more details on the extended evolutionary 
synthesis see Pigliucci and Müller (forthcoming).
2 See, for instance, Mayr and Provine (1980), Gould (1983), Bechtel (1986), Mayr (1993), Smocovitis (1996), 
Love (2009).
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and simply test the theories in the wilderness of empirical research, i.e. in the different fields 
touched by theories of cultural evolution. They take the empirical stance. I will take a third, a 
reflective stance. Its aim is, first, to make the often implicit epistemic criteria explicit – criteria 
used for evaluating the analogy in the skeptical and the empirical stance. Its aim is, second, to 
compare how these criteria are connected to specific kinds of synthesis.
1. Three theoretical roles of culture and a bias towards synthesis 
In principle, culture can enter an all-encompassing evolutionary perspective in three different 
ways. First of all, culture can be considered as a factor in the development of individuals, 
influencing the phenotype and co-determining with other factors the selection pressures of 
individual organisms. The disciplinary contexts in which this role is important include 
developmental psychology, other fields of psychology, educational research, and the like. 
Second, culture can be taken as a separate system (or process) of heredity and evolution. 
Cultural change is then treated as an evolutionary process in its own right, i.e. as cultural evolution 
occurring in addition to biological evolution of organisms and biological species. If culture 
occupies this theoretical role, then culture is not a factor (part of the explanans of development) 
but an explanandum, i.e. a phenomenon or subject matter that one wants to explain. The disciplines 
that have culture as an explanandum in this sense are cultural anthropology, sociology, economics, 
history, and the like. 
Third, culture can appear as a phylogenetic factor in the overall system (or process) of evolution 
of organisms, which have a body, a mind as well as a culture. As a factor in the phylogenetic 
evolution of organisms, culture changes not only the phenotype, but also the environment and 
can lead to effects known as co-evolution, niche construction, or the so-called Baldwin effect etc.3
Here, the second role will be in focus. It is the one that is most interesting if forms of synthesis 
are at issue, since, historically, the concept of cultural evolution has been involved in two 
diametrically opposed initiatives: one opposing a specific kind of synthesis at the beginning of the 
20th century, and one furthering a specific kind of synthesis today. Both initiatives – the one for 
separation and the one for unity – led to new important insights, as this paper aims to illustrate. 
One of the reasons, however, why unity is often favored is that it is thought to be fruitful in the 
sense of leading to new insights, theories, or even fields. That this does not exclude that separation 
can be equally fruitful should be evident, but might well be ignored in discussing synthesizing 
social sciences and humanities with evolutionary thinking. The close coupling of the proliferation 
of disciplines in the last 200 years, and the accelerated change in the sciences since then, points 
already against a bias towards synthesis. Separation has fruitful potential. In this paper, however, I 
will look at one specific example: theories of cultural change that use concepts from biology to 
understand culture can be maintained with a clear separationist stance and can be fruitful 
nonetheless. In other words, the claim is that a separationist stance can also lead to important 
novel scientific fruits to harvest for scientific change. To use an analogy myself: the evolutionary 
synthesis showed us that ‘geographic’ isolation is a creative factor in the evolution of species and 
this paper aims to provide a first step towards a more balanced and contextualised view of the 
value of synthesis: isolation and plurality can equally be creative, not only in nature, but also in 
science. 
To reach this balanced and contextualised point of view the kinds of synthesis involved in the 
analogical transfer of the concept of evolution to the phenomenon of culture have to be clearly 
3 For an analysis of the origin of these three roles and a more detailed account of them see Kronfeldner 
(2009). 
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delineated. Let me first point to the kinds of unities that are not at issue. An analogical transfer of 
evolutionary ideas to culture is neither concerned with, nor excludes hierarchical kinds of a general 
‘unity of science’. At issue here is not the question of whether culture is part of a compositional 
hierarchy of entities, with the entities of physics as the most fundamental ones (ontological unity of 
science). Theories of cultural evolution are simply not concerned with this kind of synthesis, even 
though they are compatible with a compositional hierarchy and the related unity of science. 
Similarly, at issue is not whether the theory of cultural evolution can be reduced to the theory of 
biological evolution (reductive unity of scientific theories). Most of the time, the question of the 
unity of the scientific method is also not at issue, except for the discussion about quantitative versus 
qualitative methods in social sciences and humanities.4 Thus, we do not have to worry about these 
traditional, complicated, and in history and philosophy of science extensively treated issues of 
ontological, theory-reductive, or methodological unity of science. With this in mind we can 
proceed to discuss other kinds of synthesis. But before we can do so, a clearer picture about 
theories of cultural evolution has to be outlined. 
2. Cultural evolution from Darwin till today
If we extend evolutionary theory to culture as a separate system of heredity and change, we apply 
the Darwinian ‘paradigm’ to culture in an analogous or formal manner. Darwinian analogical 
reasoning was used already back in the days of Darwin. Charles Darwin (1859; 1871) himself spoke 
of the evolution of languages: they develop and differentiate in a similar fashion as biological 
species. At the end of first edition of “On the Origin of Species” he then wrote: “In the distant future 
I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, 
that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin 1859, p. 487). Yet, with ‘distant’ and 
‘important’ he did not mean fellows like us at the beginning of the 21st century. This becomes 
evident from the edition of 1877, where he decided to be a bit more specific. The same passage now 
reads: “In the future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based 
on THE foundation already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of 
each mental power and capacity by gradation. MUCH light will be thrown on the origin of man 
and his history.” (Darwin 1876, p. 427; Emph. added)
Herbert Spencer applied evolutionary thinking to almost everything, including culture, 
society, and mind.5 The latter is often ignored since his social Darwinism has dominated the 
reception of his philosophy. William James (1880) also wrote in his famous essay on Great Men 
and Their Environment: “A remarkable parallel, which I think has never been noticed, obtains 
between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of zoological evolution as expounded 
by Mr. Darwin on the other” (James 1880, p. 163). But according to William James, Spencer was 
still too much of a Lamarckian, which he was. He therefore ends up, James complains, with false 
pictures about mind and culture. For James, Spencer was not a Darwinist since the decisive part of 
Darwin’s theory was that it allowed portraying humans as free in the following sense. Humans are 
not just reacting to the world, as in a Lamarckian picture, which he treated as analogical to theories 
of associationist learning; on the contrary, humans freely create ideas and select them afterwards. 
After having ideas freely generated in the mind, ideas are tested against the world. Some survive 
the test, some die. Since it is the accumulation of free acts of individuals, the same holds for 
4 See for instance Mesoudi (2007) for defending theories of cultural evolution because they allow for 
quantitative approaches. See Fracchia and Lewontin (1999) for a critique of this as narrow-minded 
scientism. 
5 See, for instance, Spencer (1898). 
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cultural change (i.e. history). In a nutshell, Darwinism applied to mind and culture meant for 
James freedom, in strong contrast to most people at the end of the 19th century. But it could do so 
only since he applied evolutionary theory in a strictly analogous manner. 
Then Alfred L. Kroeber (1917) came along and used Weismann’s Neo-Darwinism, in a similar 
manner as James used Darwin. But while James focused on the historical importance of the 
individual and on the independence of the human mind from sense experience and thus from the 
‘law of association,’ Kroeber focused on the independence of cultural change from biological 
evolution. Yet, he used, as James did, Darwinian theorizing to do so. The point of view he defended 
was that culture is a phenomenon sui generis, and comes ‘on top’ of biological evolution, since it is, 
as biological evolution, a system of heredity and change in its own right. And most importantly, he 
claimed that we could see this parallel only if we take Neo-Darwinism seriously and that meant: 
to abandon any belief in Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics. I will say more on his 
case below. 
Cziko (1995, p. 134) refers to Alexander Bain as the first one stressing an analogy between 
biological evolution and scientific discoveries as early as 1868. For Bain the key about scientific 
discoveries was trial-and-error, which was interpreted as analogous to the process of biological 
evolution as Darwin described it. Augustus Pitt-Rivers, Thomas H. Huxley, James M. Baldwin, 
Chancey Wright, Paul Souriau, and Ernst Mach, and certainly many others are also on the list of 
having drawn an analogy between evolution and the development of human culture and mind.6 
As indicated above, today evolution is everywhere. There is “evolutionary-” epistemology, 
game theory, computing, medicine, ethics, aesthetics, economy, psychology, linguistics, pedagogy, 
evolutionary approaches to creativity, etc., and, last but not least, theories of cultural evolution – 
the heirs of James’ and Kroeber’s approaches, focusing on human history or cultural change and 
using evolutionary theory to understand it. Even if all these different approaches use evolutionary 
theory, they all try to describe and explain different phenomena, cultural change is only one of 
them.7 Furthermore, even if they want to describe and explain the same phenomenon, they might 
still pick different elements from contemporary Darwinism or interpret the elements in different 
manner. One of the differently interpreted elements is the concept of heredity. 
Today, there are two schools that dominate the analogical applications of evolutionary theory 
to cultural change: memetics and dual inheritance theories. The standard reference point of both 
are two classical papers of Donald T. Campbell (1960; 1965): Blind Variation and Selective Retention 
in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Process and Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-
Cultural Evolution. Before I describe how memetics and dual inheritance theories differ, let me 
summarize why they are labeled ‘Darwinian’ and why the label is denied to others. Darwinian 
models are usually taken to assume specific ‘mechanisms’ of change, e.g. selection processes, and 
try to derive macro-patterns from these.8 They do not refer to progressive stages. They are 
variational and populational rather than transformational or essentialist.9 They rely on a tripartite 
model for the mechanism of natural selection: variation – differential reproduction – heredity.10 
Finally, they do allow for neutral change (e.g. drift) and for multi-level selection (e.g. cultural 
group selection).11 All these points are common characteristics shared by Darwinian approaches 
6 See Campbell (1960) or Cziko (1995, pp. 134-140). 
7 For a review of the diversity of evolutionary approaches in the social sciences see O’Malley (2007). 
8 See Campbell (1965) and Mesoudi (2007). 
9 See Mayr (1959), Lewontin (1983), Kronfeldner (2007b), and Mesoudi (2007) on this issue. 
10 See Lewontin (1970) and Fracchia and Lewontin (1999). 
11 See Mesoudi (2007) for references on drift and Richerson and Boyd (2005) for cultural group selection. 
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to cultural evolution.12 Yet, there are also great differences between them: first, with respect to 
heredity, and second with respect to what the theory is meant to explain. 
Memetics relies on the postulate of so-called ‘memes,’ the alleged basic building blocks of 
culture, which are considered as having analogous properties and causal roles as genes in biological 
evolution. Richard Dawkins introduced this idea in his book The Selfish Gene (1976). It was mainly 
Daniel C. Dennett13 and David Hull,14 who backed up memetics with philosophical details. Others 
followed the idea with varying sophistication and emphasis.15 For memetics, cultural items are, 
like genes, replicators and it is the fitness of the meme itself that accounts for the diffusion of 
cultural items. As evolutionary biology is reducible to the replication of genes, cultural diffusion is 
reducible to the replication of ‘memes’ – a process that is guided by the fitness of genes or memes 
alone. Organisms, in the case of genes, and minds, in the case of memes, are mere hosts that are 
built by these replicators. They are mere consequences of the replicative power of memes. We can 
eliminate mind in our account of cultural change – if not ontologically, then as an explanatory 
important unit. Susan Blackmore is, besides Dennett, most famous for defending this seemingly 
radical thesis. At the end of her book, The Meme Machine (1999) she writes: 
This is the power and beauty of memetics: it allows us to see how human lives, 
language, and creativity all come about through the same kind of replicator power as 
did design in the biological world. The replicators are different, but the process is the 
same. We once thought that biological design needed a creator, but we now know that 
natural selection can do all the designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that 
human design required a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic 
selection can do it on its own. […] If we take memetics seriously there is no room for 
anyone or anything to jump into the evolutionary process and stop it, direct it, or do 
anything to it. There is just the evolutionary process of genes and memes playing 
itself endlessly out – and no one watching (Blackmore 1999, p. 242).
In a nutshell, according to memeticists, the unit that plays the main causal role in cultural change, 
and hence an important explanatory role, is not the human person, it is memes, which are thought 
to be ‘selfish replicators’ like genes. The explanatory goal is the diffusion of cultural units in a 
population of humans (or even the nature of mind). The time frame for the first explanandum is 
rather limited, as Gayon (2005) has stressed: it is about 100 years. 
In parallel to memetics, Luigi L. Cavalli-Sforza and Marc W. Feldman (1981), Robert Boyd and 
Peter Richerson (1985, 2005), and William H. Durham (1991) developed the philosophical frame 
of Campbell into dual inheritance theories, quantitative theories of cultural change. The literature 
on this field, also called gene-culture co-evolution, has exploded in the last couple of years. It 
finally was widened towards multiple inheritance views, claiming that we actually have at least 
four different systems of heredity interacting in the evolution of organisms: genetic, epigenetic, 
behavioral, and cultural heredity (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). It is a tradition that now also includes 
detailed phylogenetic applications of the Darwinian frame (Gray et al. forthcoming). Cultural 
evolution is then a part of the overall process of evolution, relying on a specific channel of heredity 
between organisms. All the approaches here summarized under the label ‘multiple inheritance 
theories’ use Darwinism in the sense that they try to describe and explain diffusion processes and 
12 Mesoudi (2007) states that a further common characteristic is that they allow for the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics. See Kronfeldner (2007b), claiming that it is either wrong, misleading, or 
tautological to say that cultural evolution relies on the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
13 Dennett (1995; 2001; 2002). 
14 Hull (1982; 2000). 
15 E. g. Brodie (1995), Lynch (1996), Balkin (1998), Aunger (2002). 
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the consequent higher frequency of the cultural items, either in a given population or over 
phylogenetic, i.e. historical time. Their explanatory goals are mainly two-fold: they either try to 
uncover cultural changes itself, e.g. the effects of different transmission patterns on the pattern of 
diffusion; or they try to study how culture coevolves with biology, i.e. how they influence each 
other. Tracking the phylogeny of cultures and studying the co-evolution of culture and biology 
includes a much longer time frame than the one for studying cultural change. 
Let me refer to three examples to illustrate that these approaches let to some interesting new 
hypotheses. They try to show for instance in a statistical manner how biologically maladaptive 
behavior can evolve on the basis of specific cultural transmission settings. Preferences for reduced 
family size, for instance, are maladaptive in the biological sense, since they reduce the reproductive 
output. These preferences can nonetheless spread in a population, if the transmission of these 
preferences is not vertically, between parents and children, but horizontally, between peers and 
unrelated people. Given horizontal transmission, biologically maladaptive traits can spread. 
Furthermore, they try to show that different modes of learning (individual learning, prestige bias, 
conformist bias, success bias, etc., all settings analogous to the biological mechanisms of heredity) 
lead to different macro-evolutionary patterns. Mesoudi (2007) refers to the following as an 
example. Bettinger and Eerkens (1999) studied variation in projectile point designs from the 
prehistoric Great Basin. 
 Figure 1 (from Mesoudi 2007, p. 270). 
Mesoudi summarizes their account, depicted in Figure 1, as follows: “An ancestral point design 
(A) spreads to different groups (B) where it diverges due to idiosyncratic individual learning. In C, 
indirectly biased cultural transmission causes the single point design used by the most successful 
hunter (marked with a * in B) to spread within each group. According to Bettinger and Eerkens, 
prehistoric California resembled B, where point attributes correlated poorly with one another, 
while prehistoric Nevada resembled C, where point attribute inter-correlations were high. This 
scenario (A→B→C) was simulated experimentally by Mesoudi and O’Brien (in press).”
Finally, dual inheritance theories often argue that culture is a phylogenetic factor in the 
evolution of organism. Lactose intolerance is the standard example (Richerson and Boyd 2005; 
Durham 1991). Since some people in some areas relied in the past heavily on dairy farming they 
now have genes that allows them to digest cow milk even as adults, which fosters dairy farming. In 
turn, this fosters the selection of genes for milk digestion, etc. This is co-evolution, where we have 
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nature via culture and culture via nature, not only ontogenetically but also phylogenetically, even 
though there are no ‘genes for’ dairy farming. The important consequence that can be derived 
from such examples of co-evolution is that it revises our dualistic picture about the evolutionary 
relationship between nature and culture. We learned to believe that humans are distinct because 
of culture, and that we (as a species) grew out of nature and into culture. We don’t. We evolved to 
our nature via culture and we got our culture via our nature. That is an important message 
harvested from the ‘tree of sciences’, (if it is a tree at all), made possible by mutual interaction 
between the strong but flexible branches of science, i.e. made possible by the disciplinary structure 
of science allowing for interdisciplinary interaction.
Let me stress some of the differences between memetics and dual inheritance theories. 
Although dual inheritance approaches rely on the idea that culture is a diffusion process that is 
analogous to a selection process in nature, they deny that there is a strong analogy between 
cultural change and biological evolution. According to these approaches, cultural items do not 
replicate, the origination of novelty is not ‘blind’ as in biological evolution, and the selection is 
driven by more-or-less rational decisions of individuals. They also deny that memes have 
explanatory priority over individuals. In other words, the model is not built on a narrow ‘meme 
selectionism’. They insist that the fate of cultural items is determined by a set of multiple factors, 
including the more-or-less rational decisions of human persons and the structure of the social 
system, which are not memes. Nonetheless, they insist on the fruitfulness of using the evolutionary 
paradigm for describing cultural change. 
Thus, the question remains: what do we gain by synthesizing the now often called ‘two 
cultures’16 of science by using an analogy between biological evolution and cultural change? 
3. Evaluating an analogy and four kinds of synthesis 
Analogies never state similarities in all respects, i.e., a total equivalence of the base and the target 
of the analogy. An analogy states similarity in dissimilars. We can therefore not condemn an 
analogy as ill guided, wrong or fruitless simply because there are differences between the base and 
the target of the analogy, e.g. between cultural heredity and biological heredity. Yet, somehow we 
have to evaluate the analogy, but how? I suggest using some of the standard epistemic virtues or 
values discussed in philosophy of science to do so. These values will, finally, also guide us to four 
kinds of synthesis that can be achieved by using the analogy. 
If an analogy is to be a good one, then relevant similarities (e.g. those stressed by the analogy) 
must exist. That is, the resulting theory must fulfill the standard of empirical adequacy. If the 
theory claims that culture consists of replicators and this is wrong, which I think it is, than the 
analogy is empirically inadequate. If it is true that culture is variational, which I think it is, then it 
is empirically adequate to claim that cultural evolution is a selection process as biological evolution 
is.17 
The resulting theory should also be internally and externally consistent, as any theory. External 
consistency is especially important since it asks for integration of insights from other disciplines 
or fields. External consistency leads to integration and provides us thus with the first kind of 
synthesis that we have to take into account, if we want to understand why people want to use the 
analogy. Integration is a kind of synthesis often asked for by stakeholders at the crossroad of 
biology and social sciences. An example will follow below. 
16 With reference to Snow (1969).
17 See Kronfeldner (2007a) for detailed arguments in that direction. 
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An analogy should furthermore lead to a theory that is explanatorily adequate. Explanatory 
adequacy obtains, if an explanation is not tautological and if it is competitive, i.e. if it is offered at 
a level of ‘depth’ of explanation that is standard in a specific domain occupied with a specific 
subject matter. Large parts of psychology, for instance, have reached a ‘depth’ of explanation that 
includes cognitive mechanisms and not merely beliefs and desires. Yet, most of them have not 
reached the level of neuronal patterns. Yet, the problem for memetics is that it not even reaches the 
standard of cognitive mechanisms. If meme replication, for instance, simply says that people learn 
from each other, then replication is not a concept offered at the level of cognitive mechanisms and 
the claim that culture rests on replication is thus explanatorily fruitless, i.e. trivial.18 
An analogy should also be heuristically fruitful, i.e. leading to new descriptions, explanations, 
or at least new problems. Heuristic fruitfulness is, as external consistency, an important value, 
especially for this study, since it is, as external consistency, connected to a kind of synthesis 
between academic disciplines or fields. The three examples of new hypotheses generated by the co-
evolutionary program mentioned above indicate that dual inheritance theories can fulfill this 
standard. In addition, above I presented co-evolutionary explanations, such as the explanation of 
lactose intolerance, as creating not only new insights but a whole new theory for an area belonging 
neither to natural sciences nor to social sciences alone. In other words, co-evolutionary theory is 
an interfield theory.19 It creates or defines new problems or even fields of problems. This is more 
than integration, which is crossing boundaries between disciplines in order to get resources for a 
given problem. Coevolutionary theories thus established what I would like to call a heuristic 
synthesis: the heuristic establishment of new problems or even new interfields. 
In classical accounts of epistemic values, discussed in post-Kuhnian approaches to confirmation 
theory, scope is also on the list of virtues for theories. Yet, an increased scope can refer to different 
issues. One is expansion, i.e. increasing the validity of a theory by expanding its range of application. 
This is connected to the quest for a reductive unity of science: you reduce a theory if you show that 
you can derive it from a more general theory, i.e. if this general theory is shown to apply to the to-
be-reduced part of the ‘world’. One example should suffice: when you try to reduce mental 
properties to physical ones, you try to show that physical laws hold for this part of the world in the 
same way as they hold for stones. Fracchia and Lewontin (1999, p. 54) are thus very likely correct 
in stating that “the demand for a theory of cultural evolution also arose from among the natural 
sciences, particularly among evolutionary biologists for whom the ability to explain all properties 
of all living organism, using a common evolutionary mechanism, is the ultimate test of the validity 
of their science.” Even though one would have to support this claim with detailed case studies, I 
think that the motivation biologists have for applying evolutionary theory outside of the realm of 
biology is very likely often driven by the epistemic value of increasing scope. Richard Dawkins 
(1982, p. 112), for instance, justified his idea that culture is governed by ‘memes’ along these lines. 
He did so after he was severely criticized for the idea as not being a fruitful theory of culture. In a 
nutshell, his reply to the critique was that what he intended was not a theory of culture but rather 
to illustrate the scope of his concept of replication, which secures the foundation of his gene 
selectionism. 
Others, however, might appreciate theories of cultural evolution for a different reason 
connected to scope. Philosophers, and certainly many others as well, often watch out for a common 
frame of discourse or a ‘big picture’. Thus, they want, for instance, a ‘Menschenbild’, a unified 
image of man, which none of the specialized sciences can provide anymore from its own sources 
alone. The current specialization of sciences and the consequent division of labor between them is 
increasingly judged to be devastating for any such unified understanding of being human. With 
18 See Kronfeldner (2007a) for a detailed critique along these lines. 
19 The term interfield theory stems from a paper from Darden and Maull (1977).
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the disciplinary structure of science, human life has been stratified. But for practical or existential 
reasons, we still strive for a unified picture of ourselves. Thus, a ‘Menschenbild’ has to be synthesized 
out of the bits and pieces offered by the multitude of sciences. Consequently, concepts that allow 
knitting the bits and pieces together are very likely much welcome, even though they might not do 
any explanatory or heuristically fruitful work, except the one that it allows the knitting together of 
the bits and pieces. One of the reasons why David Hull (2000, pp. 43, 46) appreciated memetics is 
that it allows us to have a common language for constructing a big picture.20 More examples could 
certainly be named. Yet the intention here is simply that this can be the motivation beyond 
bringing culture and evolution together. It is an important motivation since it provides us with 
our fourth kind of synthesis: big-picture-synthesis. 
Four kinds of unity thus emerged from our analysis. They are: (i) integration, (ii) heuristic 
synthesis, (iii) increasing scope, and (iv) big-picture-synthesis. I will not use them to discuss the 
value of specific version of the analogy between cultural change and human history. Only the 
following will be important. Given that resistance to the analogy between culture and evolution 
relies on one or more of the values above, disagreement about the analogy probably also depends 
on the choice of the value. The analogy might turn out to be justifiably given one value and might 
fail to do so given another one. One example has to suffice. In their well-known critique of theories 
of cultural evolution, Fracchia and Lewontin (1999, pp. 67-78) complain, besides other things, that 
integration or expansion is gained at the cost of explanatory depth, a price they are not prepared 
to pay. “[B]ecause cultural evolutionary theories are based on a unitary, transhistorical principle, 
they produce explanations that are too broad to be either falsifiable or explanatory.” (ibd., p. 76) 
Yet, they ignore that others might have reasons for paying that price or that the theory might be 
heuristically fruitful with respect to specific hypotheses and a good one on that ground. Still 
others, in turn, might wrongly correlate integration with heuristic fruitfulness and ignore that 
resisting integration can also be fruitful. They would ignore or wrongly assume a certain relation 
between the disparate epistemic values. 
What I shall do in the remaining is to show that integration and heuristic synthesis – and the 
respective epistemic values supporting them – are distinct and independent: one can occur 
without the other. There can be integration that fails to be heuristically fruitful and there can be 
heuristic synthesis (generation of new ideas, fields, etc.) without integration, i.e. on the basis of 
separation. Only the latter will be illustrated. There are cases where it is more productive, in the 
service of scientific change, to batten down the hatches of ones scientific horizon. Sometimes it is 
fruitful to separate one from other perspectives and to ignore, for specific goals, that, well, 
everything in reality hangs together and nothing is thus autonomous. 
4. Integration, separation and the fruits from the tree of sciences
I treat the following views as representative for a widespread bias in current debates about evolution 
and culture. Outlining the reasons why social scientists have to listen to the ‘insights’ of 
evolutionary psychology, Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby write: 
Conceptual integration generates this powerful growth in knowledge because it allows 
investigators to use knowledge developed in other disciplines to solve problems in their own. 
The causal links between fields create anchor points that allow one to bridge theoretical or 
methodological gaps that one’s own field may not be able to span. This can happen in the 
behavioral and social sciences, just as it has happened in the natural sciences. Evidence about 
cultural variation can help cognitive scientists decide between competing models of universal 
cognitive processes; evidence about the structure of memory and attention can help cultural 
20 See also Geertz (1966) against the ‘stratificatory’ account of man. 
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anthropologists understand why some myths and ideas spread quickly and easily while others 
do not […] At present, crossing such boundaries is often met with xenophobia, packaged in 
the form of such familiar accusations as ‘intellectual imperialism’ or ‘reductionism.’ But by 
calling for conceptual integration in the behavioral and social sciences we are neither calling 
for reductionism nor for the conquest and assimilation of one field by another. Theories of 
selection pressures are not theories of psychology. And theories of psychology are not theories 
of culture; they are theories about some of the causal mechanisms that shape cultural forms. 
[…] conceptual integration simply involves learning to accept with grace the irreplaceable 
intellectual gifts offered by other fields. To do this, one must accept the tenet of mutual 
consistency among disciplines, with its allied recognition that there are causal links between 
them. Compatibility is a misleadingly modest requirement, however for it is an absolute one. 
Consequently, accepting these gifts is not always easy, because other fields may indeed bring 
the unwelcome news that favored theories have problems that require reformulation. (Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby 1992, pp. 12-13)
As indicated above, nobody involved in debates about evolution and culture asks for reductionism 
in the sense that we should give up the disciplinary structure of science. The disciplinary structure 
of science developed hand in hand with Darwin’s brainchild and stands today as a bulwark in the 
way of any imperialist, reductionist unification and does so for a reason. But, as said, Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby do not ask for this, they ask for integration, i.e. external consistency. 
Describing the way scholars and scientists from different backgrounds discussed the biological 
foundation of human culture, Peter Weingart reports: 
[…] we experienced a Babylonian confusion of disciplinary languages, the thematic unity 
and social proximity gradually led to the realization that methods could be transferred, terms 
borrowed, explanations integrated, and intellectual unity achieved, after all. Thus, a consensus 
emerged. The issue of human culture poses a challenge to the division of the world into the 
realms of the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’, and hence to the disciplinary division of scientific 
labor. In our view, the appropriate place for the study of human culture is located between 
biology and the social sciences. (Weingart 1997, viii) 
Cosmides and Tooby refer to integration in the sense that cultural anthropologists have to take 
care that what they claim is consistent with well-established knowledge from evolutionary theory, 
while considering their version of evolutionary psychology as providing the new ‘irreplaceable 
intellectual gifts’ everybody has to take into account. I take Weingart to be referring to something 
else, namely to the interdisciplinary endeavor to join forces in order to explore new fields, e.g. co-
evolution, which is more a case of our second kind of synthesis, heuristic synthesis, the creation of 
something new. 
Implicit or explicit in claims such as Barkow et al. seems to be an important assumption: that 
it is because of integration (and probably only in case of integration) that we reach novelty (i.e., new 
ideas, new methods, or new interfield theories representing whole new interdisciplinary fields). In 
other words, there might be an assumption involved that only integration ‘generates this powerful 
growth in knowledge’ as Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby put it. A review of a historical example 
from the history of theories of cultural evolution, representing a standard example in the 
development of disciplines, shall illustrate that such an assumption is ill guided. 
Alfred L. Kroeber (1876-1960), the first ‘Boasian’, had a specific and explicit attitude towards 
separation and fruitfulness. He wrote the following in 1952, reviewing a productive career in 
‘cultural anthropology’: 
Any theory that specializes on culture must of course recognize that, in the case of man, 
society and culture always co-occur, so that the phenomena available necessarily have both a 
social and a cultural aspect. Since societies comprise individuals and especially since 
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individuals are heavily shaped by their culture, there is also a third aspect or factor 
immediately involved in the phenomena, that of psychology or personality – apart from more 
remote considerations, such as the biological nature of people and the subhuman environment 
in which they operate. It is of course possible to try to study the cultural, social, and 
psychological aspects simultaneously and interwoven, as they occur. Such a meshed 
understanding is obviously the broadest and is therefore desirable in principle. However, it is 
also much the most difficult to attain, because more variable factors are involved. Also it is 
plain that the most valid and fruitful synthesis, other things being equal, must be the one 
which is based on the most acute preceding analysis. Such analysis is going to be more 
effective if directed at an isolable set of factors than at several interacting ones. Premature 
and short-circuiting synthesizing is thus avoided by discrimination between the aspects or 
levels that come associated in phenomena, and by unravelling, out of the snarl with which 
actuality presents us, the factors of one level at a time and seeing how far they can be traced 
as such, before retying them into a web of larger understanding with the other strands.  
The level which I have personally chosen or become addicted to is the cultural one. This is not 
the only way of proceeding, but it is my way, and it seems the most consistent with an 
integrative-contextual or ‘historical’ approach. (Kroeber 1952, p. 7).
Kroeber followed this strategy from the very beginning of his career. He is well-known for his 
boundary building, defending what has been called a ‘cultural determinism’, the claim that only 
culture explains culture, which is demonstrated in the just quoted statement. From the very 
beginning, cultural determinism was not meant ontological, but epistemological and pragmatic: 
Kroeber claimed the right to focus, the right to ignore, for a while at least. At the same time, he 
claimed that others should equally focus since the phenomenon that cultural anthropologists 
study with their tools are different from the subject matter of biologists. Thus, he claimed authority 
for a neatly defined part of the phenomena under scrutiny in science, and this part he termed, 
interchangeably: culture, the superorganic, history, civilization. It is a phenomenon sui generis, 
with its own scientific experts, the cultural anthropologists. 
As indicated in the first part of this paper, Kroeber used an analogy between biological and 
cultural change to establish this autonomy of cultural anthropology. Thus, he secured boundaries 
by dialectically crossing them. He referred to new developments in biology, mainly the 
Weismannian theory of heredity. Weismann denied that any inheritance of acquired characteristics 
is possible and claimed on this basis the all-sufficiency of selection. As Weismann did before him, 
Kroeber said that only if we replace Lamarckian inheritance with the concept of cultural 
inheritance, would we be able to see that cultural change is historically not correlated with 
biological change. One can change without the other and is autonomous in that sense. As long as 
there is a belief in Lamarckian inheritance, however, we will think of culture as reducible to nature. 
In the grip of Lamarckism, culture slowly but steadily becomes nature, habit becomes instinct, 
acquired becomes innate – all via the biological inheritance of acquired characteristics. In the 
Lamarckian picture, the two kinds of evolutions are correlated: if one changes, the other does too. 
Historically, belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to explain the evolution 
of mental abilities and to claim that cultural differences correlate with racial differences, for 
instance in Herbert Spencer’s philosophy. On the basis of a Weismannian point of view, however, 
you cannot infer racial differences from cultural differences since the two are independent, 
decoupled from the very first moment when the first animal managed to learn socially, i.e. from 
the birth of culture via nature. 
Even though people have and still defend scientific racism on all kinds of grounds, I regard 
Kroeber’s claim of the ‘autonomy of culture’ as a historically important insight that helped to fight 
the scientific racism of the early 20th century, which was supported by the belief in the inheritance 
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of acquired characteristics. Thus, Kroeber developed an important and fruitful thesis by using an 
analogy between cultural and biological heredity. 
The analogy was, however, not used for synthesis but for a hard divide: between culture and 
nature and between cultural anthropology on the one hand and physical anthropology and 
genetics on the other hand. Note that he did not want to say that physical anthropologists or 
geneticists don’t have a word to say on humans. He only believed that it is fruitful, if each of these 
has a domain of its own. In the context of his time, I believe, he was right: it certainly was more 
fruitful at that time that each had a domain of his own.21 
Since Kroeber used the concept of dual inheritance, he can be considered as a kind of 
‘precursor’ of contemporary dual inheritance theories. Thus, the history of theories of cultural 
evolution shows that with respect to cultural inheritance there never was a historical hourglass of 
heredity: heredity was narrowed, but it was not hardened. The multiple inheritance view brought 
home so vividly now by multiple inheritance theories, was present all the time. Yet heredity was 
fragmented by the division of scientific labor and by and large stays so until today, even if the 
fragmented channels of heredity are looked at now from a more integrative and interactionist 
perspective. We approach a new synthesis, but it is one that presupposes the foregoing separation 
of the perspectives that shall be united – as separate ones. 
In sharp contrast to contemporary dual inheritance theorists, Kroeber used the concept of 
cultural inheritance to demarcate the domain of cultural anthropology, which was still in the 
making at that time. He thus defended the place of cultural anthropology, against the social and 
political hegemony of racist hereditarianism and the scientific force of the new genetics. He crossed 
the field of anthropology towards biology and used Weismann’s theory of heredity in order to 
establish clear boundaries between the two disciplines at a time when both were expanding their 
scientific and institutional setting. He was doing so in order to establish a clear specialization, a 
differentiation, i.e. a clear division of labor, between anthropology and biology, and between 
physical anthropology and cultural anthropology. When disciplines emerge, it is unlikely that 
their representatives are open-minded, for ‘worldly’, i.e. merely pragmatic, reasons: they have to 
establish themselves first and get a place in the midst of other disciplines. They have to appropriate 
phenomena. In other words, separationist initiatives have their institutional, social, or political 
background, as do unificationist ones (Galison and Stump 1996). But despite these social reasons 
both can lead to fruitful scientific results. 
Conclusion and outlook
Depending on context, crossing borders can be used to divide disciplines or to unite them. In both 
cases, the results may contribute important new insights or even open up whole new continents 
for research, such as the discipline of cultural anthropology and the field of co-evolution. This is 
the main point I wanted to make in this paper. A bias towards integration (as an epistemic value) 
is thus unjustified, and it is so on the following grounds: If integration is valued because it helps us 
to progress, then separation has to be taken as equally valuable, if it helps us to progress. Whether 
integration (or separation) is fruitful certainly depends on the circumstances. 
The argument for the fruitfulness of integration as well as separation rests on the distinction 
between four kinds of synthesis: integration, heuristic synthesis, expansion, and big-picture-
synthesis. These represent four ways of how two domains can unite via the exchange of methods, 
concepts, theories, a hypothesis, or evidence. 
21 See Kronfeldner (2009) for more details and references on his case. 
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Many issues have been left aside here. The most important ones should at least be named before 
closing: ambiguity might play an important fruitful role in the trading between disciplines, the 
epistemic values in the use of analogies might conflict in further ways and it is unclear whether 
there is a clear hierarchy between them. Finally, many historical details regarding the social and 
cultural background of the kinds of synthesis and of separation are missing. 
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